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Identity,	  Affective	  Attachments,	  and	  US-­‐Iranian	  Nuclear	  Politics	  
	   There	  has	  been	  a	  notable	  contrast	  in	  approach,	  tone,	  and	  behavior	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	  Obama	  administrations	  with	  regard	  to	  Iran.	  	  Obama’s	  first	  term	  was	  characterized	  by	  maintaining	  tough	  economic	  sanctions	  on	  Iran	  backed	  up	  by	  fairly	  hawkish	  rhetoric	  regarding	  both	  the	  supposed	  nature	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  their	  intentions.	  	  Upon	  signing	  into	  US	  law	  in	  2010	  the	  Comprehensive	  Iran	  Sanctions,	  Accountability,	  and	  Divestment	  Act,	  Obama	  stated	  that	  Iran	  has	  “violated	  its	  commitments,	  defied	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  resolutions,	  and	  forged	  ahead	  with	  its	  nuclear	  program	  –	  all	  while	  supporting	  terrorist	  groups	  and	  suppressing	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Iranian	  people”	  (Obama	  2010).	  	  Other	  members	  of	  the	  first-­‐term	  administration	  went	  further.	  	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Hilary	  Clinton	  –	  who,	  as	  a	  presidential	  candidate,	  claimed	  that	  the	  US	  could	  “totally	  obliterate”	  Iran	  (Morgan	  2008)	  –	  suggested	  Iran	  must	  rethink	  its	  “dangerous”	  nuclear	  policy	  and	  that	  it	  is	  “moving	  toward	  a	  military	  dictatorship”	  (Sturcke	  2010).	  	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Leon	  Panetta	  (2011)	  labeled	  Iran	  an	  “international	  pariah”	  and	  that	  that	  “no	  greater	  threat	  exists	  to	  the	  security	  and	  prosperity	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  than	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  Iran.”	  	  However,	  by	  Obama’s	  second	  term	  starting	  in	  early	  2013,	  this	  kind	  of	  rhetoric	  –	  although	  still	  maintaining	  key	  underlining	  elements	  –	  began	  to	  give	  way	  to	  less	  confrontational	  language	  that	  more	  emphasized	  the	  possibility	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  states.	  	  Iran	  has	  little	  featured	  in	  Obama’s	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  addresses,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  mentioned	  little	  is	  noted	  other	  than	  reassurances	  that	  America	  will	  not	  allow	  Iran	  to	  develop	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  (Obama	  2012).	  	  More	  important	  is	  that	  a	  “peaceful	  resolution	  of	  this	  issue	  is	  still	  possible,	  and	  far	  better,	  
and	  if	  Iran	  changes	  course	  and	  meets	  its	  obligations,	  it	  can	  rejoin	  the	  community	  of	  nations”	  (Obama	  2012).	  	  In	  the	  2015	  State	  of	  the	  Union,	  Obama	  (2015)	  emphasized	  that	  “diplomacy	  is	  at	  work	  with	  respect	  to	  Iran”	  and	  should	  therefore	  be	  allowed	  to	  continue,	  yet	  ensured	  that	  the	  “American	  people	  expect	  us	  only	  to	  go	  to	  war	  as	  a	  last	  resort,	  and	  I	  intend	  to	  stay	  true	  to	  that	  wisdom.”	  	  	  	   There	  are	  numerous	  mutually-­‐reinforcing	  reasons	  for	  this	  shift	  in	  language.	  	  One	  likely	  reflects	  the	  election	  of	  moderate	  Hassan	  Rouhani	  as	  Iranian	  president	  in	  2013,	  from	  which	  followed	  a	  number	  of	  friendly	  overtures	  and	  unprecedented	  meetings	  (since	  the	  1979	  revolution)	  between	  Iranian	  and	  US	  officials.	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  also	  coincides	  with	  substantially	  increased	  efforts	  towards	  sensitive	  negotiations	  with	  Iran	  over	  its	  alleged	  nuclear	  program.	  The	  “Joint	  Comprehensive	  Plan	  of	  Action,”	  signed	  between	  Iran	  and	  the	  P5+1	  powers	  (five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  plus	  Germany)	  was	  finalized	  in	  July	  2015.	  	  It	  involves	  concessions	  from	  both	  Western	  powers	  and	  Iran,	  and	  is	  centered	  around	  three	  main	  issues:	  nuclear	  infrastructure,	  transparency,	  and	  sanctions.	  	  First,	  Iran	  agrees	  to	  never	  produce	  or	  otherwise	  acquire	  nuclear	  weapons,	  and	  ensures	  that	  its	  nuclear	  capacities	  (such	  as	  uranium	  enrichment)	  are	  solely	  focused	  on	  civilian	  energy	  production.	  	  Second,	  in	  return	  Western	  powers	  agree	  to	  lift	  existing	  economic	  and	  financial	  sanctions	  on	  Iran.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  agrees	  to	  terminate	  all	  previous	  resolutions	  relating	  to	  the	  Iranian	  nuclear	  issue,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  US	  agreement	  to	  cease	  bilateral	  sanctions.	  	  Third,	  these	  parallel	  processes	  of	  peaceful	  nuclear	  capacity	  development	  and	  international	  regulatory	  inspections	  will	  made	  transparent	  by	  international	  regulatory	  bodies.	  	  
Specifically,	  the	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  will	  subject	  Iran	  to	  an	  extensive	  inspection	  regime,	  including	  maintaining	  a	  long-­‐term	  presence	  in	  Iran,	  close	  monitoring	  of	  uranium	  development,	  and	  centrifuge	  technology,	  among	  other	  issues	  (White	  House,	  Key	  Excerpts	  of	  the	  JCPOA,	  2015).1	  	   The	  significance	  of	  these	  changes	  –	  both	  in	  policy	  and	  rhetoric	  –	  mark	  a	  potentially	  momentous	  shift	  in	  US-­‐Iran	  relations.	  	  Their	  importance	  should	  not	  be	  understated.	  	  In	  particular,	  given	  the	  Obama	  Administration’s	  notably	  harsher	  rhetoric	  toward	  Iran	  during	  its	  first	  term,	  such	  a	  comprehensive	  agreement	  with	  Iran	  and	  such	  a	  primary	  issue	  was	  far	  from	  a	  foregone	  conclusion.	  	  Yet,	  despite	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  negotiations,	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  Obama	  administration	  still	  bears	  marks	  of	  the	  identity	  dynamics	  that	  have	  driven	  US	  policy	  toward	  Iran	  for	  the	  last	  three	  decades.	  	  This,	  in	  some	  sense,	  is	  to	  be	  expected.	  	  Decades	  of	  mistrust	  and	  tension	  cannot	  be	  swept	  away	  through	  a	  set	  of	  negotiations	  on	  one	  issue.	  	  However,	  even	  within	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  shifting	  discourse	  on	  Iran,	  an	  unspoken	  set	  of	  assumptions	  is	  subtly	  evident.	  	  Despite	  the	  new	  tone	  of	  cautious	  and	  tentative	  cooperation,	  official	  US	  discourse	  is	  marked	  by	  similar	  assumptions	  and	  affective	  undercurrents	  as	  the	  first	  Obama	  administration’s	  more	  hawkish	  stance	  toward	  Iran	  –	  even	  if	  the	  rhetoric	  itself	  is	  less	  overtly	  antagonistic.	  	  This	  chapter	  helps	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  conditions	  for	  this	  agreement	  came	  about	  despite	  the	  harsher	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Obama	  first	  term.	  	  	  	   To	  illustrate,	  consider	  that	  for	  years	  US	  intelligence	  agencies	  have	  found	  that	  although	  Iran	  is	  developing	  its	  nuclear	  energy	  capabilities,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  full	  text	  of	  the	  agreement	  at	  http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.	  	  	  
it	  has	  engaged	  in	  direct	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  The	  2007	  US	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  found	  that	  Iran	  ended	  its	  pursuit	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  2003	  and	  that	  although	  its	  uranium	  enrichment	  capabilities	  continued	  (which	  Iran	  maintains	  is	  for	  civilian	  purposes	  of	  energy	  generation)	  that	  a	  military-­‐operated	  weapons	  program	  likely	  ended	  (Mazzeti	  2007).	  	  In	  2010	  and	  2012,	  subsequent	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimates	  maintained	  that	  although	  Iran	  had	  hastened	  its	  uranium	  enrichment,	  “there	  is	  no	  hard	  evidence	  that	  Iran	  has	  decided	  to	  build	  a	  nuclear	  bomb”	  (Risen	  and	  Mazzetti	  2012).	  	  Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  of	  a	  weapons	  program,	  US	  foreign	  policy	  elites	  –	  including	  the	  Obama	  administration	  –	  nevertheless	  evidently	  believe	  that	  Iran	  desires	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  This	  disconnect	  between	  evidence	  and	  belief	  could	  potentially	  be	  explained	  via	  recourse	  to	  psychological	  theories	  of	  misperception	  (Jervis	  1976).	  	  Yet,	  the	  individual	  level-­‐of-­‐analysis	  focus	  of	  most	  political	  psychology	  frameworks	  (McDermott	  2004)	  often	  neglects	  the	  multiple	  intersubjective	  factors	  at	  play.	  	  Mistrust	  no	  doubt	  plays	  a	  role	  here,	  too,	  as	  both	  sides	  readily	  admit.	  	  However,	  what	  is	  often	  missing	  –	  somewhat	  surprisingly	  –	  from	  scholarship	  are	  the	  affective	  and	  emotional	  politics	  involved	  in	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations.	  	  This	  display	  of	  belief	  in	  spite	  of	  evidence	  points	  towards	  what	  Mercer	  (2010)	  terms	  “emotional	  beliefs.”	  	  That	  is,	  “feeling	  is	  believing	  because	  people	  use	  emotion	  as	  evidence”	  (Mercer	  2010:	  1).	  	  Building	  upon	  these	  insights,	  this	  chapter	  draws	  upon	  Slavoj	  Žižek’s	  social	  psychoanalytical	  framework	  to	  contend	  that	  the	  intersections	  of	  identities	  and	  affect	  are	  central	  to	  unraveling	  this	  empirical	  puzzle	  posed	  by	  the	  nuclear	  politics	  between	  Iran	  and	  the	  US.	  	  Dynamics	  of	  affect	  and	  emotion	  are,	  this	  chapter	  argues,	  key	  to	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  
understanding	  of	  the	  politics	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Iran	  regarding	  the	  latter’s	  nuclear	  program.	  	  Specifically,	  Žižek’s	  approach	  helps	  to	  account	  for	  the	  peculiar	  dynamics	  of	  beliefs	  and	  evidence	  in	  contemporary	  US-­‐Iranian	  nuclear	  politics,	  and	  points	  to	  the	  overlapping	  roles	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  affect	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identity.	  	   The	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  	  First,	  it	  briefly	  reviews	  existing	  arguments	  regarding	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations,	  and	  finds	  that	  most	  work	  has	  neglected	  affective	  factors.	  	  Both	  realist	  and	  constructivist	  analyses	  rightly	  focus	  on	  the	  geostrategic	  concerns	  and	  socially	  constructed	  perceptions	  involved.	  	  However	  these	  studies	  tend	  to	  neglect	  the	  affective	  dimensions	  involved	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identity.	  	  The	  chapter	  suggests	  instead	  that	  the	  affective	  underpinnings	  involved	  in	  the	  intersubjective	  process	  of	  identity	  construction	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  disjuncture	  between	  evidence	  and	  belief	  here,	  and	  thus	  offers	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  case.	  	  Second,	  the	  chapter	  turns	  to	  Žižek’s	  (1993;	  1997)	  social-­‐psychoanalytical	  framework,	  which	  is	  concerned,	  among	  other	  issues,	  with	  how	  affect	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identity.	  	  For	  him,	  identity	  is	  constructed	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  other,	  in	  line	  with	  most	  IR	  constructivist	  frameworks	  (Wendt	  1999).	  	  However,	  where	  he	  departs	  from	  IR	  views	  is	  in	  the	  contention	  that	  affective	  aspects	  of	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  are	  deeply	  involved	  in	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  “otherness”	  for	  a	  particular	  identity.	  	  Third,	  applying	  these	  concepts	  to	  elite	  US	  discourses	  on	  Iran	  takes	  a	  step	  beyond	  (yet	  complements)	  existing	  analyses	  and	  argues	  that	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  help	  to	  not	  only	  account	  for	  discrepancies	  between	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  perceptions,	  but	  also	  begins	  to	  
capture	  some	  of	  the	  key	  affective	  underpinnings	  of	  American	  constructions	  of	  Iran	  as	  the	  “other”	  of	  US	  identity.	  
Extant	  Arguments:	  Self-­‐interests	  and	  Identities	  in	  US-­‐Iran	  Relations	  	   Most	  IR	  analyses	  of	  the	  Iranian	  nuclear	  issue	  focus	  on	  the	  conflicting	  geopolitical	  interests	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Iran.	  	  As	  structural	  realism	  argues	  that	  states	  are	  most	  concerned	  about	  their	  security	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  (Waltz	  1979),	  many	  analyses	  take	  American	  and	  Iranian	  interests	  as	  pre-­‐given	  and	  materially-­‐based.	  	  As	  Mearsheimer	  (1995:	  91)	  contends,	  “the	  distribution	  of	  material	  capabilities	  among	  states	  is	  the	  key	  factor	  for	  understanding	  world	  politics.”	  	  Through	  this	  lens,	  Iranian	  and	  US	  interests	  will	  naturally	  be	  at	  odds	  –	  Iran	  will	  to	  strive	  towards	  regional	  hegemony	  to	  ensure	  its	  security,	  and	  the	  US	  will	  aim	  to	  keep	  access	  to	  a	  strategic	  area	  as	  a	  major	  resource	  base.	  	  Along	  these	  lines,	  Kroenig	  (2009)	  suggests	  that	  states’	  nuclear	  proliferation	  decisions	  are	  based	  largely	  on	  its	  geostrategic	  position.	  	  Several	  scholars	  find	  that	  states’	  policies	  toward	  Iran	  stem	  from	  similar	  material	  interests,	  such	  as	  the	  strategic	  value	  of	  oil	  (Talmadge	  2008;	  Wagner	  and	  Onderco	  2014),	  potential	  payoffs	  in	  rational	  bargaining	  outcomes	  (Sebenius	  and	  Singh	  2012)	  or	  strategic	  reactions	  to	  Iran’s	  latent	  nuclear	  capability	  and	  “hedging”	  (Bowen	  and	  Moran	  2015).	  	  For	  Sanati	  (2014:	  126),	  most	  of	  the	  US’s	  and	  Iran’s	  behavior	  toward	  each	  other	  “stems	  from	  the	  interplay	  and	  ultimate	  collision	  of	  their	  core	  national	  interests,	  posited	  in	  the	  shifting	  power	  changes	  in	  contemporary	  history.”	  	  Stephen	  Walt	  (2013)	  succinctly	  offers	  a	  realist	  perspective,	  and	  argues	  that	  “the	  real	  issue	  isn’t	  whether	  Iran	  gets	  close	  to	  a	  bomb;	  the	  real	  issue	  is	  the	  long-­‐term	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  and	  Middle	  East	  .	  .	  .	  	  If	  Iran	  ever	  escapes	  the	  shackles	  of	  
international	  sanctions	  and	  puts	  some	  competent	  people	  in	  charge	  of	  its	  economy,	  it’s	  going	  to	  loom	  much	  larger	  in	  regional	  affairs	  over	  time.”	  	  	  	   From	  a	  constructivist	  perspective,	  other	  scholars	  have	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  socially	  constructed	  identities	  and	  perceptions	  in	  producing	  US-­‐Iranian	  tension.	  	  Taking	  a	  step	  beyond	  realism,	  constructivism	  argues	  that	  interests	  are	  not	  materially-­‐based,	  but	  rather	  coalesce	  through	  processes	  of	  social	  interaction	  via	  language,	  norms,	  and	  practices	  (Wendt	  1999).	  	  	  Interests	  are	  not	  themselves	  “objective”	  or	  pre-­‐given,	  but	  are	  filtered	  through	  self-­‐images	  and	  identity.	  	  Through	  this	  lens,	  antagonistic	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations	  are	  less	  material	  facts	  than	  they	  are	  products	  of	  a	  particular	  shared	  history,	  normative	  ideas,	  and	  identities	  that	  have	  developed	  in	  contingent	  ways.	  	  	  For	  example,	  Tirman	  (2009:	  536)	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  that	  narratives	  play,	  in	  that	  “perpetual	  distrust	  [is]	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  two	  national	  narratives	  and	  [is]	  reinforced	  by	  the	  actual	  actions”	  of	  both	  Iran	  and	  the	  US.	  	  Similarly,	  Fayyaz	  and	  Shirazi	  (2013)	  demonstrate	  that	  representations	  of	  Iran	  in	  American	  media	  overwhelmingly	  portray	  an	  “enemy”	  image	  that	  defines	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  and	  meanings	  given	  to	  Iran	  within	  US	  culture.	  	  Adib-­‐Moghaddam	  (2007;	  2009)	  further	  shows	  how	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations	  are	  not	  merely	  the	  conflicts	  of	  material	  national	  interests,	  but	  rather	  have	  deeper	  roots	  in	  discursive	  contexts	  and	  symbolic	  politics	  that	  produce	  antagonistic	  identities.	  	  For	  him	  (2009:	  512),	  a	  key	  task	  is	  to	  explore	  “representations	  of	  Iran	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  how	  the	  fundamental	  friend-­‐enemy	  distinction	  setting	  the	  two	  countries	  apart	  has	  come	  about.”	  	  More	  specifically,	  in	  American	  politics	  Iran	  holds	  a	  particularly	  central	  position	  within	  neoconservatives	  discourses.	  	  Iran	  occupies	  a	  
“prominent	  place	  in	  the	  imagination	  of	  influential	  neoconservative	  strategists	  with	  direct	  links	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  in	  Washington	  and	  immense	  resources	  to	  influence	  public	  discourse	  in	  the	  USA”	  (Adib-­‐Moghaddam	  2007:	  636).	  	  A	  key	  theme	  of	  these	  studies,	  then,	  is	  that	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations	  are	  less	  the	  product	  of	  naturally	  opposed	  material	  interests	  but	  instead	  are	  socially-­‐produced	  through	  narratives	  that	  shape	  shared	  understandings	  of	  the	  relationship	  in	  particular	  ways.	  	   Both	  accounts	  are	  useful	  in	  illuminating	  competing	  geostrategic	  interests	  and	  in	  uncovering	  the	  socially	  constructed	  identities	  constituting	  the	  antagonistic	  politics.	  	  Yet,	  each	  account	  suffers	  from	  a	  few	  weaknesses.	  	  What	  accounts	  for	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  US	  obsession	  with	  Iran	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  poses	  little	  material	  threat	  to	  the	  US?	  	  As	  constructivists	  have	  long	  noted,	  realist	  conceptualizations	  of	  interests	  and	  threats	  as	  materially-­‐based	  and	  pre-­‐given	  do	  not	  give	  adequate	  explanatory	  weight	  to	  the	  power	  of	  narratives	  to	  shape	  shared	  understandings,	  and	  to	  explain	  how	  interests	  and	  perceptions	  of	  threat	  can	  change	  over	  time	  (Thrall	  and	  Cramer	  2009).	  While	  constructivism,	  in	  this	  sense,	  remedies	  some	  of	  realism’s	  shortcomings,	  it	  also	  has	  trouble	  explaining	  several	  issues.	  	  For	  example,	  constructivism’s	  contention	  that	  identities	  (and	  therefore	  interests)	  are	  socially	  constructed	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  variability	  of	  threat	  perceptions.	  	  Yet	  constructivism	  has	  trouble	  explaining	  how	  some	  narratives	  prevail	  while	  others	  do	  not.	  	  Why	  do	  some	  narratives	  “win”	  over	  others?	  	  While	  constructivist	  research	  has	  recently	  begun	  to	  engage	  with	  emotions	  (Ross	  2014),	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinctive	  affective	  aspect	  to	  how	  narratives	  of	  identity	  are	  efficacious.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  given	  that	  identities	  and	  narratives	  are	  historically	  contingent	  constructs,	  
what	  accounts	  for	  the	  visceral	  emotional	  “grip”	  of	  narratives	  beyond	  their	  mere	  social-­‐constructedness	  (Glynos	  2001:	  195)?	  	  Both	  realism	  and	  constructivism	  neglect	  the	  role	  of	  affect	  and	  emotion	  in	  the	  intersubjective	  processes	  of	  identity	  construction.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  process	  that	  Žižek’s	  framework	  of	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  can	  help.	  
Desire	  and	  Enjoyment	  in	  National	  Identity	  	   Žižek’s	  analysis	  of	  identity	  has	  similar	  starting	  points	  to	  many	  in	  IR	  who	  have	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  language	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  process.	  	  Žižek’s	  Lacanian-­‐inspired	  framework	  shares	  many	  of	  the	  assumptions	  about	  ontology	  and	  epistemology	  underlying	  discourse	  approaches	  in	  IR,	  and	  starts	  from	  the	  notion	  that	  agents	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  reality	  outside	  of	  narratives,	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  “framings	  of	  meaning	  and	  lenses	  of	  interpretation,	  rather	  than	  objective,	  historical	  truths”	  (Hansen	  2006:	  7).	  	  Subjects	  and	  their	  identities	  are	  produced	  in	  and	  through	  language,	  and	  since	  language	  has	  no	  firm	  foundation	  in	  biology	  or	  “objective”	  material	  facts,	  identities	  themselves	  have	  no	  firm	  rooting	  in	  such	  material	  factors	  (Campbell	  1998:	  12).	  	  	  	   However,	  to	  argue	  that	  identities	  have	  no	  firm	  foundation	  outside	  of	  language	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  endlessly	  fluid	  or	  infinitely	  variable.	  	  Many	  instances	  of	  discourse	  exhibit	  considerable	  power	  of	  stability	  and	  efficacy.	  	  For	  Žižek,	  this	  relative	  stability	  can	  be	  understood	  through	  two	  linked	  concepts	  –	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  	  –	  that	  aim	  to	  account	  for	  the	  visceral	  “grip”	  (Glynos	  1999)	  of	  narratives	  of	  identity,	  beyond	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  social	  constructed-­‐ness.	  	  	  
	   For	  Žižek	  (1997),	  a	  key	  question	  that	  constructivist	  approaches	  overlook	  is:	  if	  identities	  are	  never	  fully	  rooted	  or	  pinned-­‐down	  (even	  if	  they	  exhibit	  some	  temporary	  stability),	  why	  do	  subjects	  keep	  trying	  to	  fulfill	  the	  image	  of	  a	  pure,	  “whole”	  identity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  constant	  frustrations?	  	  This	  is	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  desire	  enters.	  	  As	  agents’	  identities	  are	  socially	  constructed	  through	  narratives	  –	  and	  yet	  as	  narratives	  never	  really	  produce	  the	  imagined	  “essences”	  that	  agents	  nevertheless	  believe	  in	  –	  subjects’	  desire	  for	  such	  stability	  is	  elicited.	  	  Desire	  here	  is	  understood	  not	  in	  a	  conventional	  or	  sexual	  sense,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  desire	  for	  ontological	  stability,	  an	  imagined	  stable,	  fixed,	  or	  whole	  identity.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  language	  and	  narrative	  are	  fluid	  systems,	  never	  able	  to	  fully	  deliver	  the	  pure	  identity	  they	  seem	  to	  promise,	  desire	  always	  exists	  as	  long	  as	  a	  subject	  remains	  a	  subject	  within	  discourse.	  	  This	  situation	  leaves	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  bind:	  she	  desires	  to	  attach	  herself	  to	  and	  invest	  in	  a	  narrative	  that	  she	  feels	  is	  her	  own,	  that	  fully	  represents	  her,	  yet	  no	  narrative	  ever	  fully	  delivers	  on	  this	  promise.	  	  The	  subject	  is	  thus	  left	  as	  desiring,	  desire	  remains	  unsatisfied,	  and	  the	  subject	  is	  driven	  to	  continue	  its	  identifications	  practices	  (Solomon	  2015:	  29).	  	  	  	   Although	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  social	  construction	  processes,	  desire	  functions	  alongside	  enjoyment	  in	  the	  production	  of	  subjectivity.	  	  Since	  language	  cannot	  fully	  bring	  the	  stability	  that	  the	  subject	  seeks,	  Žižek	  contends	  that	  the	  subject’s	  incompleteness	  also	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  feelings	  of	  “wholeness”	  that	  it	  aspires	  to.	  	  While	  desire	  is	  oriented	  toward	  the	  promise	  of	  enjoyment,	  enjoyment	  itself	  is	  never	  quite	  reached.	  	  “Enjoyment”	  thus	  refers	  to	  this	  always	  aspired	  to,	  and	  desired	  for,	  state	  of	  anticipated	  “wholeness”	  that	  is	  ultimately	  unattainable.	  	  This	  is	  because	  
language	  itself	  (a	  lacking	  and	  unfixed	  system)	  produces	  lacking	  subjects	  (Žižek	  1997).	  	  There	  is	  a	  continual	  frustration	  in	  relation	  to	  wholeness	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  never	  attained	  and	  is	  impossible	  to	  reach.	  	  The	  subject’s	  incompleteness	  therefore	  produces	  both	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  and	  impossibility	  of	  enjoyment.	  	  Language	  creates	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  subject	  to	  pursue	  enjoyment	  (through	  identification	  with	  narratives),	  but	  the	  enjoyment	  that	  the	  subject	  seeks	  is	  a	  retroactively	  created	  fiction	  produced	  only	  by	  the	  subject’s	  use	  of	  language	  to	  articulate	  its	  desires.	  	  Yet	  precisely	  because	  enjoyment	  “itself”	  cannot	  be	  captured	  in	  language	  (since	  it	  is	  illusory),	  subjects	  can	  never	  quite	  articulate	  or	  pin	  down	  what	  exactly	  attracts	  them	  to	  a	  discourse,	  yet	  it	  is	  this	  visceral	  attraction	  that	  binds	  them	  as	  subjects	  to	  the	  discourse.	  	  Žižek	  offers	  the	  example	  of	  the	  enjoyment	  underlying	  religious	  devotion.	  	  When	  a	  believer	  describes	  his	  spiritual	  experience	  to	  a	  skeptic	  and	  cries,	  “‘You	  don’t	  really	  understand	  it	  at	  all!	  There’s	  more	  to	  it,	  something	  words	  cannot	  express!’	  he	  is	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  perspective	  illusion:	  the	  precious	  agalma	  perceived	  by	  him	  as	  the	  unique	  ineffable	  kernel	  which	  cannot	  be	  shared	  by	  others	  (non-­‐believers)	  is	  precisely	  jouissance	  [enjoyment]”	  (Žižek	  1997:	  50).	  	   A	  more	  explicitly	  political	  example	  –	  and	  one	  that	  bears	  directly	  on	  US	  constructions	  of	  Iran	  –	  is	  Žižek’s	  analysis	  of	  nationalism.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  national	  identity	  cannot	  be	  understood	  solely	  through	  constructivist	  approaches	  alone.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  fact	  that	  nations	  are	  socially	  constructed	  does	  not	  adequately	  capture	  the	  visceral,	  affective	  pull	  of	  nationalist	  identity	  discourses.	  	  Rather,	  the	  pull	  of	  the	  enjoyment	  seemingly	  promised	  through	  such	  discourses	  is	  what	  elicits	  such	  strong	  identification.	  	  One	  could	  list	  the	  markers	  of	  national	  identity	  that	  seemingly	  define	  
what	  it	  is	  (for	  instance	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  flag,	  Fourth	  of	  July,	  founding	  fathers,	  etc.),	  yet	  there	  is	  always	  something	  else,	  beyond	  such	  features,	  that	  really	  pulls	  us	  to	  identify	  with	  a	  group.	  	  This	  unnameable,	  inexpressible	  thing	  is	  enjoyment.	  	  As	  Žižek	  (1993:	  201)	  notes,	  if	  “we	  are	  asked	  how	  we	  can	  recognize	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  Thing,	  the	  only	  consistent	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  Thing	  is	  present	  in	  that	  elusive	  entity	  called	  ‘our	  way	  of	  life.’	  All	  we	  can	  do	  is	  enumerate	  disconnected	  fragments	  of	  the	  way	  our	  community	  organizes	  its	  feasts,	  its	  rituals	  of	  mating,	  its	  initiation	  ceremonies,	  in	  short,	  all	  the	  details	  by	  which	  is	  made	  visible	  the	  unique	  way	  a	  community	  organizes	  
its	  enjoyment.”	  	  	  	   The	  national	  “thing”	  –	  enjoyment	  that	  exceeds	  attempts	  to	  capture	  it	  in	  discourse	  –	  is	  also	  paradoxical,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  paradoxical	  aspect	  that	  draws	  it	  into	  nationalist	  discourses	  of	  threats	  from	  the	  “other.”	  	  Žižek	  (1993:	  201)	  notes	  that	  our	  imagined	  national	  enjoyment	  –	  our	  thing	  –	  appears	  to	  us	  “as	  something	  accessible	  only	  to	  us,	  as	  something	  ‘they’,	  the	  others,	  cannot	  grasp;	  nonetheless	  it	  is	  something	  constantly	  menaced	  by	  ‘them.’	  	  It	  appears	  as	  what	  gives	  plenitude	  and	  vivacity	  to	  our	  life,	  and	  yet	  the	  only	  way	  we	  can	  determine	  it	  is	  by	  resorting	  to	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  same	  empty	  tautology.”	  	  Think	  of	  recent	  discourses	  producing	  migrants	  as	  people	  who	  are	  usually	  weak	  and	  desperate	  yet	  who	  are	  “marauding”	  “our”	  countries	  and	  who	  threaten	  our	  “standard	  of	  living”	  (Perraudin	  2015).	  	  “The	  national	  Thing	  exists	  as	  long	  as	  members	  of	  the	  community	  believe	  in	  it;	  it	  is	  literally	  an	  effect	  of	  this	  belief	  in	  itself”	  (Žižek	  1993:	  202).	  	  What	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  nationalist	  discourses	  and	  conflict,	  then,	  is	  the	  “possession”	  of	  the	  national	  “thing”	  (Žižek	  1993:	  202).	  	  “We	  always	  impute	  to	  the	  other	  an	  excessive	  enjoyment:	  he	  wants	  to	  steal	  our	  
enjoyment	  (by	  ruining	  our	  way	  of	  life)	  and/or	  he	  has	  access	  to	  some	  secret,	  perverse	  enjoyment”	  (Žižek	  1993:	  202).	  	  Yet,	  key	  here	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  enjoyment	  is	  something	  that	  is	  never	  attainable	  (nationalist	  discourses	  promising	  to	  do	  so	  notwithstanding).	  	  “What	  we	  conceal	  by	  imputing	  to	  the	  Other	  the	  theft	  of	  enjoyment	  is	  the	  traumatic	  fact	  that	  we	  never	  possessed	  what	  was	  allegedly	  stolen	  
from	  us”	  (Žižek	  1993:	  203),	  since	  what	  is	  perceived	  to	  have	  been	  stolen	  (our	  essence,	  “way	  of	  life,”	  and	  so	  on)	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  retrospective	  presumption	  that	  we	  once	  “had”	  it.	  	  Such	  presumed	  origins	  or	  “essences”	  are	  illusory,	  but	  the	  promise	  of	  their	  delivery	  through	  nationalist	  discourses	  is	  what	  helps	  elicit	  audiences’	  affective	  identifications	  with	  such	  discourses.	  	  	  	   As	  Kingsbury	  (2008)	  discusses,	  the	  notion	  of	  enjoyment	  offers	  some	  novel	  insights	  into	  the	  politics	  of	  affect.	  	  For	  example,	  enjoyment	  suggests	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  “how	  do	  the	  painful	  yet	  thrilling	  emotional	  lures	  of	  enjoyment	  that	  irrupt	  in	  the	  social	  antagonisms	  of,	  for	  example,	  racial,	  nationalist,	  and	  ethnic	  enmities	  trump	  the	  lures	  of	  pleasures	  that	  can	  only	  be	  acquired	  in	  times	  of	  peace	  and	  material	  prosperity?”	  (Kingsbury	  2008:	  51).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  why	  do	  people	  sometimes	  seem	  to	  strongly	  desire	  conflict	  (ethnic,	  nationalist,	  or	  otherwise)	  when	  it	  will	  immediately	  result	  in	  their	  harm?	  	  The	  role	  of	  enjoyment	  in	  nationalism	  suggests	  one	  answer	  –	  that	  audiences	  become	  so	  viscerally	  attached	  to	  their	  modes	  of	  enjoyment	  that	  violence	  (at	  least	  partially)	  brought	  about	  through	  this	  politics	  of	  othering	  becomes	  a	  struggle	  over	  the	  very	  indefinable	  thing	  that	  forms	  the	  core	  of	  the	  affective	  investment	  in	  the	  nation.	  	  The	  politics	  of	  enjoyment	  thus	  suggests	  “a	  difficult	  truth:	  when	  people	  and	  groups	  are	  locked	  in	  conflict,	  they	  are	  –	  beyond	  
their	  immediate	  interest	  in	  securing	  sovereignty	  over	  another	  land	  or	  people	  –	  
already	  experiencing	  intangible	  gains”	  (Lane	  1998:	  5	  quoted	  in	  Kingsbury	  2008:	  51).	  	   As	  the	  following	  section	  suggests,	  incorporating	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  –	  more	  specifically,	  the	  “theft”	  of	  enjoyment	  –	  into	  identity	  arguments	  can	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  some	  of	  the	  heretofore	  unexamined	  affective	  identity	  politics	  surrounding	  the	  US-­‐Iranian	  nuclear	  issue.	  
“Stealing	  our	  enjoyment:”	  The	  Affective	  Co-­‐Constitution	  of	  US	  and	  Iranian	  
Identity	  
	   As	  of	  this	  writing,	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations	  seem	  to	  be	  undergoing	  some	  substantial	  changes	  as	  represented	  by	  direct	  dialogue	  between	  the	  two	  (through	  the	  P5+1	  group)	  regarding	  the	  former’s	  alleged	  nuclear	  program.	  	  The	  scope	  of	  these	  shifts	  should	  not	  be	  understated.	  	  Yet,	  even	  alongside	  the	  changes	  brought	  about	  during	  the	  second	  Obama	  administration,	  there	  are	  some	  notable	  underlying	  discursive	  similarities	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	  Obama	  administrations	  regarding	  Iran.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  underlying	  similarities	  stretch	  back	  to	  characterizations	  during	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration,	  where	  Iran	  was	  included	  in	  the	  “axis	  of	  evil”	  and	  the	  administration	  not	  only	  criticized	  Iran’s	  alleged	  pursuit	  of	  a	  nuclear	  weapon,	  but	  also	  frequently	  emphasized	  Iranian	  influence	  throughout	  the	  region	  as	  a	  threat	  in	  itself.	  	  A	  notable	  2007	  speech	  by	  Vice	  President	  Dick	  Cheney	  reveals	  some	  of	  these	  concerns.	  	  “Operating	  largely	  in	  the	  shadows,	  Iran	  attempts	  to	  hide	  its	  hands”	  in	  using	  violence	  to	  spread	  its	  influence;	  Iran’s	  “efforts	  to	  destabilize	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  to	  gain	  hegemonic	  power	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  record;”	  “Given	  the	  nature	  of	  Iran's	  rulers,	  the	  declarations	  of	  the	  Iranian	  president,	  
and	  the	  trouble	  the	  regime	  is	  causing	  throughout	  the	  region	  .	  .	  .	  our	  country	  and	  the	  entire	  international	  community	  cannot	  stand	  by	  as	  a	  terror-­‐supporting	  state	  fulfills	  its	  most	  aggressive	  ambitions”	  (Cheney	  2007).	  	  Concerns	  over	  Iranian	  influence	  would	  go	  on	  to	  form	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  discourse. 	   Obama’s	  first	  term	  discourse	  on	  Iran	  was	  marked	  by	  both	  diplomatic	  overtures	  and	  castigation	  of	  threats.	  	  While	  Obama’s	  steps	  toward	  a	  “new	  beginning”	  with	  Iran	  (Black	  2009)	  garnered	  much	  attention,	  this	  was	  often	  matched	  by	  more	  hawkish	  discourse	  by	  him	  and	  administration	  officials.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  early	  first	  term	  speech	  Obama	  (2009)	  stated	  that	  “	  Iran's	  nuclear	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  activity	  poses	  a	  real	  threat,	  not	  just	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  to	  Iran's	  neighbors	  and	  our	  allies	  .	  .	  .	  As	  long	  as	  the	  threat	  from	  Iran	  persists,	  we	  will	  go	  forward	  with	  a	  missile	  defense	  system	  that	  is	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  proven.”	  	  Former	  first-­‐term	  secretary	  of	  State	  Hilary	  Clinton	  recently	  suggested	  in	  even	  stronger	  terms	  the	  threat	  of	  Iranian	  influence:	  	   a	  lot	  of	  this	  is	  weakness	  [from	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  uprisings]	  that	  Iran	  takes	  advantage	  of,	  and	  you	  know,	  in	  this	  world,	  you	  can	  be	  mad	  at	  somebody	  taking	  advantage	  of	  you.	  But	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  that's	  your	  fault.	  That	  you	  haven't	  figured	  out	  how	  to	  defend	  yourself,	  and	  how	  to	  protect	  yourself,	  and	  how	  to	  fend	  off	  external	  interests,	  and	  how	  to	  treat	  your	  own	  people	  in	  a	  way	  that	  they	  will	  not	  look	  outside	  your	  borders.	  That's	  part	  of	  what's	  been	  going	  on,	  as	  you	  know,	  and	  the	  Iranians	  have	  been	  incredibly	  focused	  on	  exploiting	  any	  opening	  (Maloney	  2014).	  	  	  	   The	  discourse	  of	  Obama’s	  second	  term	  administration	  displays	  a	  notable	  change	  in	  tone	  from	  some	  of	  the	  more	  hawkish	  first	  term	  rhetoric.	  	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  due	  at	  least	  two	  factors:	  the	  2013	  election	  of	  moderate	  Hassan	  Rouhani	  as	  Iranian	  president,	  and	  the	  intensive	  nuclear	  negotiations	  throughout	  2013-­‐2015.	  	  While	  much	  of	  the	  second	  term	  discourse	  has	  been	  more	  restrained,	  many	  of	  the	  same	  
themes	  are	  on	  display	  regarding	  the	  concern	  about	  broader	  Iranian	  influence	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Second	  term	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Chuck	  Hagel	  noted	  that	  “that	  while	  Iran's	  nuclear	  program	  is	  a	  critical	  worry,	  its	  other	  missile	  threats,	  terrorism	  links	  and	  occasional	  provocative	  maritime	  behavior	  also	  greatly	  concern	  the	  US	  and	  the	  region.	  And	  those	  threats	  are	  not	  addressed	  by	  the	  nuclear	  agreement”	  (Associated	  Press	  2013).	  	  Elsewhere	  he	  assured	  Congress	  that	  he’ll	  “focus	  intently	  on	  countering	  Iran’s	  malign	  influence”	  (Capaccio	  2013).	  	  More	  recently,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Kerry,	  who	  has	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  nuclear	  negotiations,	  tried	  to	  reassure	  Gulf	  allies	  that	  the	  US	  was	  prepared	  to	  “push	  back”	  against	  Iranian	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  (Reuters	  2015).	  	  Similarly,	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Ashton	  Carter	  promised	  that	  the	  US	  would	  combat	  Iran’s	  “malign	  influence”	  despite	  the	  nuclear	  deal	  (Cooper	  2015).	  	  In	  a	  strategic	  sense,	  much	  of	  this	  discourse	  regarding	  Iranian	  “influence”	  is	  aimed	  at	  allaying	  US	  regional	  allies	  concerned	  that	  a	  nuclear	  deal	  may	  lessen	  the	  US’s	  stance	  towards	  what	  many	  Gulf	  states	  view	  as	  a	  common	  foe.	  	  	  	   However	  in	  a	  broader	  sense,	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  concern	  about	  not	  only	  potential	  Iranian	  weapons	  but	  “malign	  influence”	  directly	  echoes	  themes	  that	  stretch	  back	  at	  least	  thirty	  years	  in	  US	  foreign	  policy	  history.	  	  As	  Andrew	  Bacevich	  (2005)	  has	  discussed,	  US	  policy	  towards	  the	  Middle	  East	  has	  been	  largely	  aimed	  at	  retaining	  dominant	  influence	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Although	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  to	  1979,	  the	  US	  sought	  to	  ensure	  political	  stability	  and	  access	  to	  oil	  in	  ways	  that	  minimized	  overt	  American	  involvement,	  the	  Iranian	  revolution	  and	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  prompted	  the	  US	  to	  become	  much	  more	  deeply	  involved.	  	  Dealt	  with	  these	  crises,	  President	  Jimmy	  Carter	  believed	  that	  the	  Middle	  
East	  needed	  to	  take	  center	  stage	  in	  US	  foreign	  policy.	  	  “A	  great	  contest	  for	  control	  of	  that	  region	  had	  been	  joined,	  one	  that	  Iran’s	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  had	  made	  unmistakably	  clear	  was	  not	  simply	  an	  offshoot	  of	  the	  already	  existing	  East-­‐West	  competition	  (Bacevich	  2005:	  181).	  	  The	  following	  year	  he	  articulated	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Carter	  Doctrine,	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  US	  would	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  region’s	  politics.	  	  “Any	  attempt,”	  Carter	  boldly	  declared,	  “by	  an	  any	  outside	  force	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  region	  will	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  assault	  on	  the	  vital	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  and	  such	  an	  assault	  will	  be	  repelled	  by	  any	  means	  necessary,	  including	  military	  force”	  (quoted	  in	  Bacevich	  2005:	  181).	  	  Bacevich	  argues	  that	  this	  basic	  tenet	  has	  guided	  US	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  the	  Middle	  East	  ever	  since.	  	  “As	  a	  consequence,	  each	  of	  President	  Carter’s	  successors	  has	  expanded	  the	  level	  of	  US	  military	  involvement	  and	  operations	  in	  the	  region”	  (Bacevich	  2005:	  181).	  	  American	  identity,	  in	  this	  sense,	  as	  long	  been	  constructed	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Iranian	  “other.”	  	  	  	   Of	  note	  here	  are	  the	  near	  mirror	  images	  of	  American	  and	  Iranian	  ambitions	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Despite	  the	  shifted	  tone	  and	  more	  cautiously	  optimistic	  discourse	  on	  Iran,	  much	  of	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  second	  term	  discourse	  nevertheless	  continues	  many	  of	  the	  same	  core	  themes	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  developed	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years.	  	  In	  one	  sense	  this	  is	  expected	  –	  although	  Obama	  has	  drawn	  down	  American	  forces	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  during	  his	  tenure,	  a	  wholesale	  shift	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  either	  toward	  Iran	  or	  the	  Middle	  East	  was	  not	  expected.	  	  However,	  what	  often	  gets	  neglected	  in	  both	  realist	  and	  constructivist	  analyses	  of	  US-­‐Iranian	  relations	  is	  what	  this	  mirroring	  reveals.	  	  While	  Iran	  is	  the	  enemy	  it	  curiously	  
seems	  to	  embody	  all	  the	  traits	  that	  America	  should	  be	  with	  regards	  to	  Middle	  East	  politics.	  	  The	  image	  of	  an	  ambitious	  Islamic	  competitor	  suggests	  that	  while	  this	  reinforces	  American	  desires	  to	  be	  the	  promoter	  of	  stability	  in	  the	  region,	  there	  nevertheless	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  to	  admire	  in	  Iranian	  assertiveness.	  	  Iranian	  influence	  throughout	  the	  region,	  prominent	  and	  now	  growing,	  has	  long	  been	  a	  common	  trope	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  discourse,	  and	  Obama’s	  second	  term	  rhetoric	  –	  despite	  a	  shift	  in	  tone	  regarding	  nuclear	  negotiations	  –	  remains	  largely	  unchanged	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  Moreover,	  something	  about	  “their”	  ambition	  in	  spreading	  their	  influence	  reinforces	  our	  notions	  of	  who	  we	  should	  be	  during	  this	  competition.	  	  Each	  mention	  of	  Iranian	  ambition	  and	  influence	  by	  American	  officials	  is	  usually	  matched	  by	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  US	  has	  fallen	  behind	  and	  that	  it	  must	  step	  up	  similar	  efforts.	  	  These	  discourses	  subtly	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  enjoyment	  discussed	  above.	  	   In	  nationalistic	  tensions	  it	  is	  often	  not	  merely	  a	  fear	  of	  the	  Other	  for	  fear’s	  sake	  but	  a	  fear	  that	  the	  Other	  might	  steal	  our	  national	  “thing”—our	  enjoyment.	  “We	  always	  impute	  to	  the	  ‘other,’”	  Žižek	  (1993:	  203)	  observes,	  “an	  excessive	  enjoyment:	  he	  wants	  to	  steal	  our	  enjoyment	  (by	  ruining	  our	  way	  of	  life)	  and/or	  he	  has	  access	  to	  some	  secret,	  perverse	  enjoyment.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  basic	  paradox	  is	  that	  our	  Thing	  is	  conceived	  as	  something	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  other	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  threatened	  by	  him.”	  	  In	  American	  discourses	  on	  Iran,	  the	  mutual	  construction	  of	  self	  and	  other	  occurs	  not	  only	  on	  a	  discursive	  level,	  but	  also	  through	  a	  perceived	  “theft	  of	  enjoyment.”	  	  The	  representations	  of	  Iranian	  influence,	  and	  concerns	  over	  the	  Iranian	  nuclear	  program,	  in	  American	  discourse	  are	  in	  a	  sense	  a	  mirror	  of	  what	  American	  
behavior	  should	  be.	  	  The	  US	  should	  not	  only	  keep	  Iran	  from	  developing	  nuclear	  weapons,	  but	  should	  also	  work	  to	  counter	  Iranian	  influence	  across	  the	  region.	  	  Deeply	  rooted	  in	  American	  objectives	  since	  at	  least	  the	  Carter	  presidency,	  American	  discourse	  on	  Iran	  displays	  a	  concern	  that	  Iran	  is	  enjoying	  precisely	  what	  America	  
should	  be	  enjoying	  –	  growing	  influence,	  ambition,	  and	  assertiveness	  in	  a	  vital	  region.	  	  American	  identity	  has	  long	  been	  constructed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Iranian	  other	  (Adib-­‐Moghaddam	  2009).	  	  Yet	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identity	  is	  the	  affective	  dynamics	  of	  desire	  and	  enjoyment.	  	  While	  realist	  and	  constructivist	  lenses	  point	  to	  the	  strategic	  and	  socially	  produced	  aspects	  of	  US	  identity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Iran,	  they	  say	  little	  about	  the	  role	  of	  affect	  and	  desire.	  	  Although	  Iran	  poses	  little	  material	  threat	  to	  the	  US,	  and	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  identity	  is	  socially	  constructed	  by	  “othering”	  Iran,	  the	  politics	  of	  enjoyment	  offer	  a	  new	  insight	  into	  the	  relationship.	  	  That	  is,	  not	  merely	  is	  American	  identity	  constructed	  against	  the	  Iranian	  “other,”	  but	  that	  the	  politics	  of	  enjoyment	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  these	  particular	  narratives	  have	  gained	  affective	  currency	  with	  American	  audiences.	  	  Iran	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  enjoying	  growing	  dominance	  of	  Middle	  East	  politics	  –	  precisely	  the	  element	  that	  American	  identity	  is	  seen	  as	  lacking	  in	  relation	  to	  Iran.	  	  Iran	  is	  “stealing”	  American	  enjoyment	  of	  political	  hegemony	  of	  Middle	  East	  politics,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  affective	  pull	  that	  helps	  to	  (in	  part)	  account	  for	  the	  American	  obsession	  with	  Iran	  despite	  a	  lack	  of	  material	  threat.	  	  	  	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  affective	  links	  between	  discourse,	  desire,	  and	  enjoyment	  help	  to	  account	  for	  the	  discursive	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  Obama	  administration	  heavily	  pushed	  for	  a	  robust	  nuclear	  agreement	  with	  Iran.	  	  Despite	  little	  to	  no	  
evidence	  that	  Iran	  is	  actually	  development	  nuclear	  weapons	  (according	  to	  successive	  US	  National	  Intelligence	  estimates),	  the	  Obama	  administration	  (and	  many	  prominent	  elite	  voices	  in	  the	  US	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum)	  nevertheless	  evidently	  believes	  that	  Iran	  wishes	  to	  develop	  them.	  	  Although	  political	  psychological	  approaches	  (McDermott	  2004)	  would	  well	  analyze	  the	  individual	  traits	  and	  variables	  that	  might	  account	  for	  elite	  diplomatic	  behaviors	  during	  the	  agreement	  negotiations,	  such	  approaches	  would	  be	  less	  able	  to	  capture	  the	  broader,	  intersubjective	  collective	  understandings	  and	  affective	  movements	  that	  produce	  the	  
conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  negotiations	  and	  agreements	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Following	  a	  range	  of	  discourse-­‐based	  research	  (Doty	  1996;	  Hansen	  2006),	  this	  chapter	  contends	  that	  examining	  the	  discursive	  production	  of	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  is	  a	  key	  move	  in	  foreign	  policy	  analysis.	  	  Following	  Doty	  (1996),	  this	  chapter	  asks	  how	  it	  became	  possible	  –	  or	  commonsensical	  –	  that	  an	  Iranian	  nuclear	  agreement	  was	  necessary	  and	  desirable	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  American	  national	  interests.	  	  The	  affective	  investments	  of	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  in	  particular	  representations	  of	  Iranian	  identity	  have	  helped	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  particular	  “common	  sense”	  in	  the	  US	  about	  Iran	  regarding	  their	  alleged	  nuclear	  ambitions.	  	  However,	  the	  prevailing	  American	  “common	  sense”	  regarding	  Iran	  is	  neither	  neutral	  nor	  pre-­‐given.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  ongoing	  series	  of	  representations	  that	  elicit	  American	  identifications	  that	  are	  underpinned	  by	  affective	  investments	  of	  desire	  and	  enjoyment.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  discursive	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  nuclear	  agreement	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Iran	  are	  in	  an	  important	  part	  shaped	  by	  the	  desires	  for	  enjoyment	  represented	  in	  American	  images	  of	  Iranian	  identity,	  and	  
resultant	  American	  desires	  to	  pursue	  fantasies	  of	  control	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  
Conclusion	  	   Although	  there	  are	  notable	  contrasts	  in	  the	  way	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  discourse	  on	  Iran	  has	  shifted	  from	  his	  first	  to	  second	  terms,	  much	  of	  the	  official	  language	  carries	  with	  it	  many	  of	  the	  same	  themes	  that	  have	  characterized	  US	  rhetoric	  on	  Iran	  for	  thirty	  years.	  	  Obama’s	  second	  term	  discourse	  has	  often	  been	  much	  more	  muted	  in	  tone	  due	  to	  the	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  the	  nuclear	  negotiations.	  	  However,	  alongside	  these	  more	  diplomatic	  openings	  are	  continued	  concerns	  of	  Iran’s	  perceived	  increasing	  influence	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Harking	  back	  to	  US	  foreign	  policy	  themes	  that	  stretch	  back	  to	  at	  least	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  definition	  of	  US	  interests	  as	  political	  and	  military	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  concern	  over	  both	  Iranian	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  influence	  mark	  a	  continuation	  of	  American	  perceptions	  and	  policy.	  	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  to	  in	  order	  to	  more	  comprehensively	  understand	  not	  only	  the	  identity	  politics	  behind	  American	  obsessions	  with	  Iran	  –	  despite	  little	  material	  threat	  –	  analyses	  should	  consider	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  affect	  is	  entangled	  with	  identity.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  Žižek’s	  concepts	  of	  desire	  and	  enjoyment	  –	  notions	  that	  capture	  aspects	  of	  the	  affective	  construction	  of	  identity	  –	  the	  essay	  suggests	  that	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  second	  term	  rhetoric	  displays	  some	  of	  the	  same	  affective	  underpinnings	  as	  prior	  US	  discourses.	  	  While	  the	  essay	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  enjoyment	  (or	  more	  accurately,	  the	  perceived	  “theft”	  of	  enjoyment)	  is	  not	  the	  only	  affect	  or	  emotion	  involved	  here,	  it	  does	  aver	  that	  the	  US-­‐Iranian	  relationship	  is	  ripe	  for	  further	  work	  on	  the	  mutually	  entangled	  roles	  of	  affect,	  identity,	  and	  security.	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